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1. Introduction 
One of the central concerns of many genocide studies 
scholars and activists is turning the well-worn phrase 
“never again” into reality. A central component of en-
couraging genocide prevention is the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine that sets out the responsibility of 
states to uphold the human rights of populations under 
their own control and in other societies in which the 
local state cannot or will not protect its own people. 
Upholding basic human rights and human security 
around the world is framed as both a moral good and 
duty that applies to us all. But while most states and in-
ternational organizations have rhetorically expressed 
their support for R2P and genocide prevention, we 
have yet to see states put the principle into practice in 
more than a handful of cases.  
In the last few years some analysts have tried to 
foster the political will for genocide prevention by mak-
ing what they hope will be a more persuasive argu-
ment to policy-makers. Instead of relying on moral 
claims based on responsibility, duty, and the indisputa-
ble moral wrongness of genocide, calls have been 
made to see prevention as a matter of western states’ 
national interest, including their national security 
broadly construed. This argument speaks to our na-
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tional and rational self-interest by suggesting that fail-
ure to prevent atrocities abroad imperils western soci-
eties in very real ways.  
My question in this study is whether genocide pre-
vention conceptualized as a necessary policy to ensure 
western societies’ own security is a logical foundation 
for asserting that western states live up to their 
avowed responsibility to protect vulnerable popula-
tions around the globe. This is a different, albeit relat-
ed, question from whether appeals to our national se-
curity will be successful in motivating effective 
genocide prevention by policy-makers. 
On the face of it, the genocide prevention-as-
national security thesis appears sensible. After all, 
purely humanitarian appeals have not produced con-
sistent and robust genocide prevention. To get the at-
tention of political leaders and policy-makers do we 
not need to “speak their language” by appealing to na-
tional security? What better way to conceptualize the 
need for planning and action than to tie genocide pre-
vention to warding off threats, one of the most basic 
functions of the state? Indeed, in his address announc-
ing the creation of his administration’s Atrocity Preven-
tion Board, President Obama emphasized that 
“[p]reventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core na-
tional security interest” of the United States (Presiden-
tial Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, 2011, p. 1).  
If we look at how this argument has been articulat-
ed in policy reports over the past few years, we can see 
that this position is not entirely convincing. To demon-
strate this point I turn to two policy reports that have 
made the case for genocide prevention based in large 
measure on national security considerations: Prevent-
ing Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers by the 
Genocide Prevention Task Force co-chaired by Made-
leine Albright and William Cohen and the Will to Inter-
vene Project by the Montreal Institute of Genocide and 
Human Rights Studies co-chaired by Frank Chalk and Lt. 
Gen. (Ret.) Romeo Dallaire. The central problem is that 
both reports fail to offer a sound foundation for pre-
vention grounded in security, first, because the logic of 
the “widened” traditional security advocated by the 
authors does not fit comfortably with the evidence 
provided in the reports; and second, alternate concep-
tions of security that prima facia would seem to ac-
commodate conceptualizing atrocity prevention as a 
security issue—securitization and risk and uncertain—
similarly do not provide a logical foundation for opera-
tionalizing prevention. 
The question then becomes, how do we make the 
case for turning R2P from an agreed upon principle in-
to common practice? In the last part of the article I 
draw on the reports’ general appeal to the self-interest 
of would-be interveners in the west and contemplate 
whether operationalizing R2P might be more effective-
ly grounded in appeals to reputational stakes tied to 
western states’ construction of their own identity as 
responsible members of the international community. I 
then briefly examine whether the codification of R2P as 
a legal obligation might facilitate atrocity prevention 
and conclude that entrenching R2P in international law 
may not facilitate this process of norm internalization 
and that norm internalization in itself cannot guaran-
tee consistent atrocity prevention. In short, while 
western governments may want to be seen to be doing 
good, they may not regularly acting to do good in the 
international system even if they were to be required 
to do so under international law.  
Throughout the article, I am also trying to grapple 
with hard cases in which western interests—security, 
economic, geo-political—are not at play. These cases 
suffer from what I call the “Goldilocks problem”. These 
cases constitute one of two kinds of circumstances in 
which prevention and intervention is unlikely to occur 
since they fall outside the “Goldilocks zone”, that is, 
the parts of the world that are of direct interest, for a 
variety of reasons, to western states. Non-Goldilocks 
cases of atrocity occur in locations that are of either lit-
tle strategic value or of “hyper” strategic value such 
that intervention is considered to be too dangerous a 
proposition for all involved.  
My interrogation of the Genocide Prevention Task 
Force and Will to Intervene reports is admittedly quite 
narrow. Although the reports are designed to offer a 
set of policies for policy-makers, my focus is on the un-
derlying security logic found in the reports since the 
authors ground their policy prescriptions in a logic of 
national interest tied largely (although not exclusively) 
to national security broadly construed. I proceed in a 
fashion analogous to a legal scholar examining the legal 
reasoning of a judicial decision, and as such, my analy-
sis does not address the potential effectiveness of the 
prescriptions outlined by the authors, nor do I engage 
with the very important literatures on genocide pre-
vention or R2P.  
2. The Genocide Prevention Task Force and the Will to 
Intervene Reports: An Overview 
2.1. Preventing Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. 
Policymakers (The Genocide Prevention Task Force 
Report) 
As its title suggests, the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
Report is a set of recommendations aimed exclusively at 
American leaders, policy-makers, and institutions. Not-
ing that R2P is in part the inspiration for the report, the 
authors suggest that “there is a growing understand-
ing…that states have a basic responsibility to protect 
their citizens from genocide and mass atrocities” and 
that “[n]o government has the right to use national sov-
ereignty as a shield behind which it can murder its own 
people. The challenge for the world community is not 
only to state this principle, but to implement it” (The 
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Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008, p. xxi).  
In making the case for genocide prevention as a 
foreign and defence priority for the United States, the 
co-authors assert that their report is inspired by three 
key considerations. The first is the immorality of geno-
cide and other atrocities that constitute “a direct as-
sault on universal human values, including, most fun-
damentally, the right to life.” The report immediately 
goes on to evoke a second and much more central con-
cern that “[g]enocide and mass atrocities also threaten 
core U.S. national interests” since genocides “feed on 
and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states, with 
dangerous spill-over effects that know no boundaries.” 
The third concern is reputational. If the United States 
does not plan for and engage in successful genocide 
prevention around the globe U.S. “credibility and leader-
ship” may be at stake (The Genocide Prevention Task 
Force, 2008, p. xv). 
As a security threat, genocide is said to fuel instabil-
ity in weak and undemocratic states. These kinds of 
states engage in terrorist recruitment, human traffick-
ing, and experience civil strife, all of which have “dam-
aging spill-over effects for the entire globe.” Further, 
the report identifies the monetary costs and logistical 
challenges of humanitarian responses to refugee flows 
sparked by genocidal violence, noting that the United 
States often ends up footing much of the bill to feed, 
house, and care for refugees. It is in the United States’ 
own interest to pay less up front to prevent genocide 
than more later to deal with its aftermath. Finally, the 
report links the United States’ national interest and se-
curity to America’s international reputation, warning 
that if the country does not establish the capability and 
will to prevent genocide, the international community 
will come to see the United States as “bystanders to 
genocide” which would in turn undermine the United 
States’ ability to be a “global leader” and “respected as 
an international partner if we cannot take the necessary 
steps to avoid one of the greatest scourges of mankind” 
(The Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008, p. xx).  
Having made the security argument, among others, 
for genocide prevention, the report outlines institu-
tional and funding reforms designed to integrate geno-
cide prevention into US foreign, defence, and devel-
opment policy-making. Political leaders, specifically the 
American president, must make genocide prevention a 
top priority and relevant Congressional committees 
should do the same. The United States government 
must develop early warning strategies and intelligence 
capabilities within existing departments and agencies 
to identify possible outbreaks of genocidal violence 
and implement a broad set of development assistance 
policies focused on democratization (including the pro-
tection of human rights and minority rights) and eco-
nomic development in vulnerable states as an early 
prevention strategy. Government should also use a car-
rot and stick “preventive diplomacy” strategy with po-
tentially genocidal regimes, develop plans for either 
the unilateral or multilateral use of force to stop geno-
cide where the killing has begun, and cooperate with 
allies and international organizations to strengthen an-
ti-genocide norms and institutions designed to prevent 
and punish atrocities. 
2.2. Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and 
Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities 
Much like the Genocide Prevention Task Force, the au-
thors of Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership 
and Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities (W2i, 2009) ar-
gue that we must build the will and capacity to stop 
mass atrocities since genocide and other gross human 
rights violations constitute threats to ourselves and to 
the world. An ideational and policy orientation that 
was sorely lacking in an earlier era of traditional state-
craft, the “will to intervene” can be fostered by appeal-
ing to our own national interest grounded in a “wid-
ened” conception of national security in a post-Cold 
War, globalized world. Based on case studies gleaned 
mostly from interviews with American and Canadian 
officials that try to account for why the international 
community failed so miserably in Rwanda but managed 
to act decisively in Kosovo (W2i, 2009), the authors ar-
gue that if we want governments to get serious about 
genocide and mass atrocity prevention we need to stop 
appealing exclusively to the injustice of such acts and 
instead frame them through the lens of national inter-
est grounded in national security.  
Mass atrocities and the “chaos and loss of life” they 
visit on their victims in turn “produce shock waves” 
that act as “seismic wrecking balls” that destabilize the 
world far beyond the regions in which they occur (W2i, 
2009, p. 4). The threats posed by atrocities abroad are 
identified by the authors as “costs” including: medical, 
health, and social costs flowing from pandemics that 
may originate and then spread from atrocity-torn areas; 
national security costs resulting from the creation of safe 
havens for piracy and terrorism in countries and regions 
that experience atrocities; financial and social costs pro-
duced by refugee flows; economic costs resulting from 
loss of access to strategic resources; and the political 
cost of alienating electoral constituencies at home. To 
eliminate or diminish these costs, and thus protect our-
selves from the fall-out of any or all of these scenarios, 
governments and civil society must work together to 
prevent atrocities in the future and stop on-going mass 
atrocities in order to ensure our own health, security, 
and economic prosperity (W2i, 2009, pp. 9-17).  
The report identifies four pillars around which the 
“will to intervene” should be mobilized: enabling lead-
ership in government particularly at the Presiden-
tial/Prime Ministerial and cabinet levels; enhancing co-
ordination between government departments and 
ministries; building institutional capacity for effective 
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prevention and intervention within government; and 
fostering knowledge through a bottom-up process in 
which Canadian and American civil society groups as 
well as the media act to inform government of and 
press for the need to engage in humanitarian interven-
tion (W2i, 2009, pp. 17-61). Similar to the Genocide 
Prevention Task Force Report, the first three pillars of 
W2i involve the introduction of new roles, structures, 
and processes in the executive, legislature, and civil 
service to make atrocity prevention a priority both in 
terms of policy importance and capacity to act.  
3. The Problem of Appealing to a Logic of Western 
National Security 
There is a certain attractiveness to the idea that we 
need to speak to government in the national interest 
security-oriented cost-benefit language to which it pre-
sumably is most accustom and which the Genocide 
Prevention Task Force and W2i authors hope it is more 
likely to listen. But what, exactly, is the conception of 
security to which the reports appeal? Both say that in a 
globalized world they take security not just to include 
military security but also economic, physical/health, 
and even reputational security. The W2i report, for in-
stance, notes that governments once only thought of 
security as “the defence of territorial borders against 
invasion and attrition”. Now “the meaning of security 
has expanded…beyond state centric concerns related 
to defence” to include a “wider variety of international 
and transnational threats affecting states and their citi-
zens” (W2i, 2009, p. 9). But beyond this the key con-
cept upon which the reports’ authors rest their case is 
left largely undefined. To be fair, the reports are not in-
tended to be scholarly exegeses on conceptions of se-
curity or an exercise in the redefinition of security. 
Nonetheless, as a scholarly reader of these reports I am 
interested in interrogating the logic of atrocity preven-
tion grounded in national interest as mostly national 
security. To do this I now turn to three (admittedly not 
exhaustive) conceptions of security found in the securi-
ty studies literature. The first is the conception seem-
ingly used by the authors themselves, what sometimes 
is called in the security studies literature “widened” se-
curity. The second and third are two conceptions of se-
curity that would appear to be the most friendly to the 
idea of motivating atrocity prevention and intervention 
by appealing to national and global security: the pro-
cess of securitization in which the inter-subjective iden-
tification and definition of threats by securitizing actors 
and an audience define what constitutes a threat and 
why; and the sociologically informed notions of risk 
and uncertainty in an interdependent globalized world. 
3.1. “Widened” Security 
Traditional understandings of security identify threats 
that are “out there” in the real world which are dis-
cernible through rational calculations of what does and 
does not objectively pose a threat to the survival of the 
state and society. Once identified, these threats must 
be neutralized through the application of (mostly mili-
tary) power and other resources. By adopting a “wid-
ened” conception of security the reports say that ob-
jective security threats include not only external 
military or political threats but also the negative effects 
of a changing climate, the spread of epidemics and 
pandemics, and the actions of non-state actors such as 
terrorist organizations and other armed groups (Buzan 
& Hansen, 2009). The reports thus contend that in this 
kind of general security climate the follow-on effects of 
genocide, regardless of where the crime is committed, 
poses pressing objective threats to Canada and the 
United States. Further, both reports see genocide not 
as a military threat or a threat to military assets (alt-
hough military assets and personnel may be put in 
harms way to stop genocide and therefore may impose 
costs on military institutions and personnel) but as a 
threat to other sectors such as the economy, the 
health and well-being of citizens, or the political for-
tunes of Canadian and American politicians. Let us now 
examine how the logic of linking genocide prevention 
to an expanded understanding of objective security 
threats fits with the arguments and evidence provided 
by the authors. Since W2i provides the most detailed 
security argument and empirical evidence, I will con-
centrate on this report specifically. 
Under “security costs” the authors of W2i cite the 
fact that regional and global insecurity is often pro-
duced by “failed states” such as Somalia. The authors 
correctly note that the collapse of the Somali govern-
ment in 1993 gave rise to warlordism within the coun-
try, piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa, and we 
might add since the publication of the report, regional 
terrorism in the form of the now Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-
Shabab. Failed states, however, are not necessarily 
synonymous with or measures of mass atrocities. The 
two are frequently related phenomena but the former 
does not always lead to the latter. Al-Shabab’s activi-
ties have had an entirely negative effect on Somalia’s 
internal security and that of its neighbours, but Soma-
lia’s status as a failed state has thus far not produced 
global or western insecurity. And while the authors as-
sert that western policymakers are beginning to take 
seriously the link between development, human rights, 
and security in places like Somalia, the authors leave 
out how western states actually dealt with the Somali 
piracy problem. Rather than addressing the problem of 
lagging development, state failure, and human rights 
abuses, western states applied hard military power 
through extensive naval patrols in much the same way 
that the very traditional security threat of piracy has 
been countered for centuries.  
The authors also recount that weak and failed 
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states have created the conditions for the emergence 
of epidemics, such as the typhus epidemic in Burundi in 
1997, and that these kinds of regional health crises 
driven by instability, conflict, and atrocities increase 
the possibility of global pandemics in an era of global 
commercial air travel. But as with the Somalia example, 
the fact situations used in W2i as evidence are not cas-
es in which mass atrocities were at play. To make the 
claim that mass atrocities are security threats to us be-
cause air travel may transport diseases to western 
countries, we would need evidence from a case where 
this has already happened or nearly happened. Alt-
hough the suffering on the ground in refugee camps 
was enormous, we did not see global disease transmis-
sion after Rwanda, or over the many years of the Dar-
fur conflict, or currently coming out of the destruction 
in South Kordofan or the Blue Nile regions of Sudan. 
The ebola crises of 2014 did not spawn global disease 
transmission despite the contagious nature of the dis-
ease, considerable fears in the west of such an out-
come, and the fact that the health care systems in Sier-
ra Leone and Liberia are still labouring under the 
damage done by years of conflict.  
In terms of political costs, W2i suggests that in Can-
ada and the United States citizens are concerned with 
human rights at home and abroad and that these in-
creasingly cosmopolitan societies have diaspora com-
munities that assert their cultural, ethnic, religious, and 
national identities in part by lobbying government to 
support their foreign policy priorities. While this is an 
accurate characterization of North America’s de-
mographics, the report offers little direct evidence that 
diaspora politics influences foreign policy and electoral 
fortunes. Sri Lankan Tamil protests in 2009 in Toronto 
and Ottawa are mentioned, as are the disruptions they 
caused, but no real evidence is provided to show 
whether or how these protests changed Canadian gov-
ernment policies with respect to the then on-going 
conflict in Sri Lanka. And of course we now know that 
this conflict ended with government forces, unre-
strained by Canadian or other western governments, 
crushing the Tamil Tigers. Diaspora communities have 
not had an appreciable effect on electoral outcomes in 
either the United States or Canada whether or not they 
vote according to their preference for greater humani-
tarian intervention in their countries of origin. Voting 
behaviour in general is not usually motivated primarily 
by foreign policy or international humanitarian issues. 
And even when it is, most diaspora and immigrant 
communities are too small and thinly dispersed across 
geographically defined electoral ridings, districts, or the 
Electoral College to affect federal and/or presidential 
elections in Canada or the United States. By the logic of 
the W2i report, refugees and already existing expat 
Rwandans in the United States, for instance, might 
have been expected to take out their frustrations on 
President Bill Clinton during his re-election campaign in 
1996. As it turned out, Clinton’s share of the popular 
vote increased nation-wide from 43% to 49% between 
the two elections and Clinton carried four out of the 
five states (New Jersey, New York, Florida, California, 
but not Texas) in which most recent immigrants to the 
United States live (http:www.pewhispanic.org/files/20 
13/02/PH_13.01.23_55_immigration_06_states). Simi-
larly the governing Liberal Party of Canada that failed 
to act during the Rwandan genocide was re-elected in 
1997, taking all but two seats in immigrant heavy On-
tario and holding all of their ridings in the city of Mon-
treal, home to many Rwandans who fled the genocide 
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/FederalRidin
gsHistory/hfer.asp?Language=E&Search=Rres&ridProvi 
nce=10&submit1=Search).  
The two cases examined in the W2i report—
Rwanda and Kosovo—also unwittingly illustrate the 
“Goldilocks problem”. Countries that experience geno-
cide and are of geo-strategic or economic value to the 
west lie within the “Goldilocks zone”. Not unsurprising-
ly they are much more likely to capture the attention 
of the international community (e.g. Libya) while coun-
tries that are not strategic or are too strategic, in that 
they have very powerful friends and neighbours, lie 
outside the Goldilocks zone. The former cases are ei-
ther unlikely to be seen as pressing national security is-
sues because of their geo-political remoteness to the 
west and/or their marginal role even in a globalized po-
litical economy, while the latter are considered to be 
humanitarian crises that cannot be stopped through 
outside intervention without risking a much wider and 
destructive conflict no matter how badly behaved the 
regime or the other parties to an atrocity may be (e.g. 
the on-going Syrian civil war). It is made painfully clear 
in the W2i report that neither the American nor Cana-
dian governments were motivated to intervene in 
Rwanda for moral or strategic considerations. The re-
port repeatedly references comments by American and 
Canadian officials that Rwanda was of no value and 
therefore of no strategic interest, or by the logic of the 
report, not in the national interest and a national secu-
rity threat. A senior US government source told the au-
thors of W2i that the US “did not have massive strate-
gic interests” in Rwanda (W2i, 2009, p. 91) while in the 
highest government circles in Canada there was “little 
interest in Africa (W2i, 2009, p. 69) because it “was not 
a priority and lay outside of Canada’s traditional zone 
of interest” (W2i, 2009, p. 70). By contrast, as we will 
see later, the report cites officials and politicians in both 
countries claiming that Kosovo required intervention be-
cause of its strategic location in Europe, the need to 
make NATO effective and relevant in a post-Cold War 
world, and in the Canadian case, the need to appear rel-
evant within the NATO alliance and to be seen as a small 
but important team player. None of the reasons offered 
by interviewees in the Kosovo case suggest a wider con-
ception of security advocated in the report.  
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Of course, one of the goals of the W2i report is to 
change perceptions of what constitutes a challenge to 
national security. But to make this argument, the re-
port needed to offer direct evidence that the costs to 
the west the authors associate with genocide, particu-
larly in parts of the world considered non-strategic, re-
ally do exist and that governments have in the past re-
sponded to what policy-makers consider to be security 
threats, foreign and potentially domestic, from mass 
atrocity situations. 
3.2. The Securitization of Threat 
That a widened traditional conception of security as ar-
ticulated and illustrated in the reports does not seem 
to effectively support the case for atrocity prevention 
may not mean that security considerations cannot pro-
vide a logical foundation for upholding R2P. Perhaps 
we can make a security-focused argument for atrocity 
prevention by looking at another understanding of se-
curity that would seem to accommodate the impera-
tive of rethinking atrocity prevention as a western se-
curity issue. Here I turn to the critical security approach 
known as “securitization”. As formulated by Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde in their seminal book Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis (1998) securitization es-
chews an understanding of security as exclusively mili-
tary “objective” threats “out there” posed mostly by 
other states in favour of security understood as an in-
tersubjective discursive process by which perceived 
threats are constructed as threats to the military, polit-
ical, economic, or social sectors of a state. The process 
of securitization involves the articulation of a perceived 
threat through a “speech act” or security discourse in 
which a particular issue is said to pose an existential 
threat to a “referent object” (e.g. the state, society, or 
a country’s territory). Responding to such a threat must 
involve extraordinary measures beyond the usual rules 
and procedures of “normal” politics (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p. 21). While an almost infinite variety of non-
traditional security issues across any sector of society 
can be articulated as existential threats to a referent 
object (e.g. drug trafficking) a threat is not successfully 
“securitized” until an audience accepts that the issue is 
a threat. Without the acceptance of the audience we 
only have a “securitizing move” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 
25). Since threats are not objective and there is no 
metric by which we can measure objective threats, se-
curitization is all about the construction of shared 
meaning. “In security discourse, an issue is dramatized 
and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by 
labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and 
right to treat it by extraordinary means”. (Buzan et al., 
1998, p. 26). 
There are three discernible areas in which the Gen-
ocide Prevention Task Force and W2i reports concep-
tualize genocide prevention as a security threat such 
that it appears to fit the securitization approach. As we 
have already seen, the reports, like the securitization 
school, adopt an expanded view of security in which 
threats range across several sectors beyond the mili-
tary-political. Second, both reports can be read as an 
exercise designed to encourage the Canadian and 
American governments to securitize genocide preven-
tion. The authors of both reports call on the Canadian 
Prime Minister and U.S. President to use their respec-
tive offices to engage in “speech acts”, in some cases 
quite literally in the Speech from the Throne and the 
State of the Union Address, to communicate the 
threats associated with genocidal violence abroad to 
their respective governmental and public audiences. 
Moreover, the bevy of institutional, procedural, and 
funding reforms meant to embed the will and capacity 
to prevent genocide in government institutions mirrors 
the idea that securitization may be institutionalized 
when a threat is securitized as persistent or likely to 
reoccur with some regularity. Finally, securitization 
would seem to dispense with the criticism I raised ear-
lier about the lack of objective threats posed by geno-
cides in regions outside the “Goldilocks zone”. As a 
constructivist framework, successful securitization 
need not, and in fact cannot, constitute an “objective” 
measurable threat. So long as Canadian and American 
leaders and policy-makers frame genocidal violence 
elsewhere as an existential threat to their own states, 
economies, or societies, and other policy-makers, insti-
tutions, and the public accept this message, then geno-
cide, wherever it happens, is a threat. But within this 
very same process of the intersubjective construction 
of meaning lie two compelling problems with reading 
the reports through the lens of securitization. 
The first problem is posed by the requirement that 
threats be securitized as “existential”. Consciously 
drawing on traditional security studies, securitization 
scholars assert that international security is about sur-
vival. There is, however, no universal standard for as-
sessing whether a threat is existential or not since 
threats “can only be understood in relation to the par-
ticular character of the referent object in question” 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p 21). What constitutes an existen-
tial threat varies across different sectors: the survival 
of the state or the armed forces, for example, in the 
military sector; the sovereignty of the state, or interna-
tional regimes in the political sector; the viability of a 
sector of the economy; collective identities in the soci-
etal sector; a habitable planet in the environmental 
sector (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 22-23). Despite the fact 
that threats are perceived and constructed, threats 
cannot be of any magnitude; they must be about sur-
vival. As noted in my earlier critique of the W2i report, 
it would be hard to credibly argue, or in the words of 
the securitization approach to “securitize” through a 
speech act, the consequences of genocidal violence 
abroad as reasonably constituting an existential securi-
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ty threat to the military, political, economic, social or 
environmental security of Canada, the United States, 
or the international system as a whole, particularly in 
non-strategic countries that fall outside the Goldilocks 
zone. Indeed with respect to the military sector, Buzan 
et al. specifically say that peacekeeping and humanitar-
ian intervention cannot be constructed as existential 
threats because they do not imperil the survival of the 
state or its armed forces and because they occur as 
“support for routine world order activities” (Buzan et 
al., 1998, p. 22).  
This observation brings us to the second problem. 
Aside from constructing threats as existential, securiti-
zation also requires that the response to securitized 
threats be “extraordinary,” going beyond the estab-
lished rules and procedures of normal politics, some of 
which may become institutionalized over time. Sensi-
bly, neither report argues that the Canadian or Ameri-
can governments should pursue genocide prevention 
through some equivalent of the Bush Administration’s 
legally suspect approach to the Global War on Terror. 
The authors of the Genocide Prevention Task Force Re-
port and W2i firmly ground their recommendations in 
either existing agencies and procedures or the intro-
duction of relatively few new institutions and policies 
designed to regularize R2P and genocide prevention as 
standard, not extraordinary, operating procedures. 
What the reports seem to be recommending is not so 
much securitization (existential threats and extraordi-
nary responses) but what securitization scholars call 
“politicization”, that is, making an issue “part of public 
policy, requiring government decision and resource al-
locations…” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23).  
That the Genocide Prevention Task Force and W2i 
authors do not call for extraordinary or extralegal 
measures is not a failing of the reports. Rather, it is a 
strength as it shows great respect for the democratic 
process and the rule of law. It does, however, under-
mine our ability to make sense of the security logic 
contained within the reports according to a securitiza-
tion model. It also means that the “politicization” of 
genocide prevention recommended in the reports 
could force prevention to compete for attention and 
resources alongside other security concerns. Stripped 
of the argument that genocide prevention is an ex-
traordinary moral imperative, prevention would be 
“normalized”, and ironically given the goal of the re-
ports, rendered just another foreign policy issue among 
many.  
3.3 Risk and Uncertainty 
Given the inability of traditional and critical concep-
tions of national security threats to make the security 
logic of the GPTF and W2i reports comprehensible, 
perhaps it would be best to abandon the notion of 
threat altogether and instead think about the reports 
as grounded in risk and uncertainty. While the reports 
themselves speak of “threats” and “costs” linked ex-
plicitly to national “security”, is it possible to frame the 
need for robust genocide prevention as a way of reduc-
ing “risk” and “uncertainty” in an increasingly inter-
connected world?  
A relatively new approach in security studies, the 
risk and uncertainty literature is a direct response to 
two developments. The first, and most general devel-
opment, is globalization characterized by increasing in-
terconnections and interactions between states and 
other international and transnational actors across a 
number of different sectors, and a blurring of the line 
between domestic and international economics, poli-
tics, cultural, and social practices. In this global context, 
multiple actors can be effected, positively and nega-
tively, by changes and crises elsewhere in the world. 
The second development is the advent of transnational 
terrorism perpetrated by diffuse networks of non-state 
actors operating with or alongside so-called “home-
grown” terrorists, both of whom operate in and exploit 
the interconnectedness of a globalized world.  
What we face in the post-9/11 world is not 
“threats” or “insecurity” in the present but what soci-
ologist Ulrich Beck has coined a “risk society” confront-
ed with an almost limitless array of incalculable risks in 
the future. These risks simultaneously result in and 
constitute uncertainty. “Risk” in a globalized late mod-
ern post-Cold-War world transcends time and space, 
forcing actors to “foresee and control the future con-
sequences of human activity” (Beck, 1999, p. 3). The 
empirically and policy-oriented literature on risk sees 
risk as harmful outcomes ranging in severity, irreversi-
bility, uniqueness, numbers affected, and temporal, 
spacial, and knock-on effects (Inter-Governmental Liai-
son Group on Risk Assessment, 2002). For constructiv-
ist risk and uncertainty scholars, risk cannot be objec-
tively defined. What constitutes a risk, and the 
probability of that risk, is constructed through meaning 
attached to the interaction of actors and intersubjec-
tive knowledge grounded in cultural beliefs, norms, 
and biases (Williams, 2008) or epistemic communities 
(Kessler & Daase, 2008). Risk and uncertainty may also 
be the prelude to catastrophe (Kessler and Daase, 
2008, p. 225). A mass casualty terrorist attack, for ex-
ample, remains a risk, the certainty of which we do not 
know or sometimes cannot even conceive, until the at-
tack occurs. Once the attack happens it ceases to be a 
risk and becomes a catastrophe.  
The concept of risk is inextricably linked to uncer-
tainty to such an extent that the two concepts cannot 
meaningfully stand alone. Since the risks the world fac-
es in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 period are fed by 
the interdependencies of a globalized world, calculat-
ing what risks we face and how likely they are to occur 
involves a considerable amount of uncertainty. This is 
what former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
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likely meant when he referred to “known unknowns” 
and “unknown unknowns”. Such “unknowns” are pro-
duced by the unknowability and thus uncertainty of a 
complex globalized modern society (Giddens, 1998, p. 
23) in which late modernity itself produces untold ben-
efits and risks. How we respond to risk and uncertainty 
is equally difficult to calculate because responding to 
risk may itself be risky since we cannot know with cer-
tainty the results of our actions. Moreover, the way in 
which we think and talk about risk can itself be danger-
ous, turning fairly improbable events, so-called “wild 
cards” or “discontinuous scenarios”, into the possible or 
even probable (Kessler & Daase, 2008, pp. 225-226).  
The GPTF and W2i reports do not consciously as-
cribe to a risk and uncertainty approach. Instead, the 
authors identify the threats, present and future, that 
they think are the by-products of unfettered genocidal 
destruction. Nonetheless, there are implicit echoes of 
the risk and uncertainty approach in the reports. The 
list of negative outcomes for the west associated with 
genocidal violence abroad includes many of the gen-
eral risks identified in the risk and uncertainty litera-
ture. Further, the risk and uncertainty approach and the 
GPTF and W2i reports all trace the ability of these nega-
tive outcomes to reach North America’s shores to the 
structures and technologies of late globalized modernity 
such as affordable transnational air travel that can 
spread refugees, terrorists, and germs around the globe.  
As with the traditional and securitization approach-
es, however, the security logic of the GPTF and W2i re-
ports does not conform particularly closely to the logic 
of risk and uncertainty. First, the reports do not see the 
negative effects of genocide on Canadian and Ameri-
can society to be potential risks in the future but actual 
tangible threats in the here and now. This is so despite 
the dearth of current or historical evidence in the re-
ports that genocides outside of the Goldilocks zone 
have such an effect. If the reports had adopted the risk 
and uncertainty perspective they would each stand on 
a firmer logical foundation since much of what the re-
ports say by way of the effects of genocidal violence on 
Canada and the United States is speculative. The au-
thors wager that in a globalized world there are future 
risks to North America of the negative effects of geno-
cide in far off lands without knowing if the risks are re-
ally there, how serious the risks are, or the ability to 
calculate the effects of Canadian and American preven-
tion and intervention strategies and whether they will 
ameliorate or exacerbate these risks. 
Second, risk and uncertainty scholars are clear that 
risk in a globalized world transcends time and space. 
But as I have already noted, the W2i report’s own stud-
ies of Rwanda and Kosovo unwittingly demonstrate 
that when it comes to genocidal violence and its effects 
on the Global North, space does matters. Western 
states only see genocide elsewhere as a threat or risk 
to themselves if the society in question is geographical-
ly close enough or strategic enough for atrocities to 
warrant a response. The 2011 UN-backed NATO inter-
vention in Libya is a case in point. Although all of the 
intervening members of NATO professed genuine hu-
manitarian concern that the civilian population of Ben-
gazi be protected (Lindstrom & Zetter, 2012) the inter-
vention was also motivated by a variety of other 
security and reputational factors. France was driven by 
the geographical proximity of North Africa, the oppor-
tunity in a live operation to try out its reintegration into 
NATO’s command structure, show-off a new fighter air-
craft, and allow President Sarkozy to realize his personal 
political goal of asserting his foreign policy prowess in 
advance of the 2012 presidential election (Lindstrom & 
Zetter, 2012, pp. 20-24). At the behest of the US, the UK 
accepted a leading role in the operation to demonstrate 
the health of the UK–US “special relationship”, as well as 
counter the spread of terrorism in the region, and bol-
ster Prime Minister David Cameron’s bona fides as an 
international leader (Lindstrom & Zetter, 2012, pp. 32-
38). The United States, meanwhile, was slower to re-
spond and did so primarily to reconfirm its commit-
ment to its European allies, to payback some of those 
allies for fighting alongside the US in Afghanistan, and 
to maintain the credibility of the UN Security Council 
(Lindstrom & Zetter, 2012, pp. 46-48). Canada was 
keen to show its continuing relevance to NATO and its 
ability to be a fighting, not peacekeeping, middle pow-
er (Domansky, Jensen, & Bryson, 2012). NATO also 
reckoned that, because of Libya’s desert geography 
and Mediterranean coastline, the use of force without 
boots on the ground (i.e. without risking NATO casual-
ties) would be “doable” (Lindstrom & Zetter, 2012).  
Third, as noted, some scholars in the risk and un-
certainty literature argue that risk is the prelude to 
harm which, when it actually occurs, is catastrophic. 
While the GPTF and W2i reports tell us in varying de-
grees of specificity what they think the harms are for 
Canada and the United States of genocide committed 
abroad, sensibly neither report claims that these harms 
would be a “catastrophe”. Genocide is literally a “ca-
tastrophe” for the victims but it is not a catastrophe for 
those of us in the west, or if it is, it is a moral catastro-
phe because of our own lack of response. As such, un-
fettered genocide cannot be credibly framed as a ca-
tastrophe beyond the society or possibly region in 
which it occurs. The logic of the risk and uncertainty 
literature in this regard is too tightly tied to mass casu-
alty terrorism aimed at the west to apply to the after-
effects of genocide executed far from home. 
Finally, while the authors of the GPTF and W2i re-
ports offer several well-meaning policy prescriptions 
for genocide prevention, they spend little to no time 
contemplating the possibility that acting to ameliorate 
risk may unintentionally create greater risks and harm. 
Both reports, but particularly the GPTF, suggest that 
long-term prevention to avoid outbreaks of genocidal 
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violence requires foreign development assistance fo-
cused on democratization, robust protection for hu-
man rights as well as economic development strategies 
to foster economic growth, the redistribution of 
wealth, and equitable access to economic opportuni-
ties for all groups in society (The Genocide Prevention 
Task Force, 2008, pp. 35-53). While these recommen-
dations are laudable they essentially require that socie-
ties vulnerable to genocide must be remade not only in 
the west’s imagine, but better. Most western coun-
tries, including the United States and Canada, would 
not live up to the proposed standards set out in the 
GPTF report.  
More importantly, the steps required to bring 
about these wholesale changes would effectively 
amount to slow-motion regime change or what could 
turn out to be, or at least look like, serial meddling in 
the internal affairs of other states in the name of long-
term genocide prevention. Not only do these kinds of 
prevention strategies risk actual or perceived neo-
colonialism, as the risk and uncertainty literature 
points out, we cannot be sure that our efforts will pro-
duce the outcomes we hope for and may in fact risk 
unintended consequences beyond our control that ei-
ther do not prevent genocide in the long-run or may 
make genocide more likely. As genocide scholar Mi-
chael Mann has argued, the beginning phase of democ-
ratization can increase the potential for genocidal vio-
lence, particularly if the democratic idea of the 
“demos” (the people”) becomes intertwined with the 
“ethnos” (race or tribe) (Mann, 2005, pp. 2-4). Short-
term diplomatic, economic, and military interventions 
face a similar problem in that they may unintentionally 
inflame potential or actual genocidal situations. Exits 
too are risky since there is no guarantee that the de-
struction will not begin anew once international forces 
leave.  
4. Prevention Tied to Self-Interest without Security: 
Reputational Stakes 
We seem to be faced with a conundrum. On the one 
hand, security and risk variously defined do not appear 
to provide a secure foundation for fostering genocide 
prevention when genocide is perpetrated beyond the 
Goldilocks zone of western national interest. On the 
other hand, the invocation of moral duties to protect 
vulnerable populations from predatory regimes and 
non-state actors continues to fall on deaf ears. How, 
then, do we make the case for prevention? Perhaps the 
answer is to retain the idea found in both reports that 
appeals should be made to national self-interest but 
decouple national interest from security. To explore 
this possibility I now turn to another source of national 
interest: concern for maintaining a state’s international 
reputation. 
As a widely agreed upon principle, but one that is 
not codified in public international law, R2P is analo-
gous in some ways to unwritten customary interna-
tional law (CIL). Neither is explicitly linked to a set of 
enforcement mechanisms or sanctions for non-
compliance. Studies of the role of reputation in inter-
national politics, specifically compliance with custom-
ary international law, suggest that states’ decisions to 
follow international rules, norms, and principles are 
grounded at least in part in states’ concern for estab-
lishing and maintaining a positive international reputa-
tion. In his compliance-based theory of customary in-
ternational law, Andrew Guzman argues that states 
comply with CIL in the absence of robust enforcement 
measures or coercion when they calculate that their 
good reputations would be at stake if they were to vio-
late these kinds of rules. As such, reputation is tied to 
“the existence of an obligation in the eyes of other 
states” (Guzman, 2002, p. 1825). A state’s commitment 
to international law “is only as strong as its reputation. 
When entering into an international commitment, a 
country offers its reputation for living up to its com-
mitments as a form of collateral”. A state’s reputation 
thus “has value and provides that country with bene-
fits” which it will not wish to jeopardize (Guzman, 
2002, p. 1825; Keohane, 1984, p. 26).  
As rational actors that make cost-benefit calcula-
tions about whether or not to comply with internation-
al rules, states must calculate whether the possible loss 
of reputation will outweigh the costs of complying with 
a rule, or if the benefits of maintaining ones reputation 
outweighs the costs of compliance. The primary cost of 
non-compliance that results in damage to a state’s 
reputation is likely to be an inability on the part of the 
reneging state to convince would-be partners that it 
can be trusted to honour its obligations in the future. 
This is particularly true for economic agreements in 
which states engage in repeat interactions (Guzman, 
2002, pp. 1851-1853). A state that fails to live up to its 
customary international economic commitments suf-
fers “reputational sanctions” that take the form of tan-
gible economic costs to the reneging state’s economy. 
Reputational sanctions are most severe when the se-
verity of the violation is high, the reasons for the viola-
tion are strategically or morally indefensible, when 
other states know of the violation, and when a state 
publicly commits to upholding a customary law but 
then clearly violates it (Guzman, 2002, pp. 1861-1865).  
If we take states’ commitment to the R2P doctrine 
and atrocity prevention as analogous to CIL we could 
then argue that appeals to national self-interest in up-
holding R2P should be linked to reputational stakes 
and the possibility of reputational sanctions if the US, 
Canada, and other states do not comply with their re-
sponsibility to protect. Some of the evidence presented 
in the W2i and GPTF reports suggest that the authors 
implicitly make this argument as do some of their in-
terviewees.  
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In their review of Canadian government decision-
making in the Kosovo case, the authors of the W2i re-
port mention the perceived importance of showing 
NATO’s relevance and capacity to act in the immediate 
post-Cold War world and Canada’s concern that its 
own and NATO’s reputations were at stake. Minister of 
Defence Bill Graham recalled that “intervention in Ko-
sovo became a ‘Canadian imperative’ by virtue of Eu-
ropean and U.S. interests in the Balkans” while another 
cabinet minister suggested that since the conflict in Ko-
sovo was occurring in NATO’s backyard, “interven-
tion…was a matter of protecting the prestige of the al-
liance. NATO’s reputation would have suffered from a 
failure in Kosovo” (W2i, 2009, p. 79). Concerning Cana-
da’s own reputational stakes, the Canadian govern-
ment felt compelled to support and participate in 
NATO’s bombing campaign over Serbia because senior 
Canadian politicians “also wanted Canada to be seen as 
a reliable international ally, to strengthen alliance soli-
darity, and to guarantee Canada a seat at the post-
conflict negotiations” (W2i, 2009, p. 85). As for uphold-
ing human rights norms, cabinet ministers and senior 
bureaucrats expressed genuine humanitarian concern 
that Kosovo not become a repeat of the massacre at 
Srebrenica or the genocide in Rwanda, the latter of 
which one official lamented “engendered a sense of 
shame”(W2i, 2009, p. 83). Once NATO came to frame 
Serbian actions in Kosovo as yet another instance of 
Balkan ethnic cleansing, NATO took the stand that “we 
couldn’t allow this to continue” (W2i, 2009, p. 84). 
Without going into the details of specific cases, the 
GPTF report also references the importance of uphold-
ing human rights norms and laws, flagging them in a fi-
nal section of the report as central to effective geno-
cide prevention (The Genocide Prevention Task Force, 
2008, pp 93-110). The report also rues at various points 
the failure in many cases of the United States and its 
allies to protect the human rights of threatened popu-
lations. The authors characterize genocide as “unac-
ceptable” and a crime that “threatens” not just Ameri-
can national security but “our values” (The Genocide 
Prevention Task Force, 2008, p. ix). Failure to stop it is 
said to undermine the United States’ ability to be a 
“global leader” and “respected as an international 
partner” (The Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008, p. 
xx). These sentiments where later echoed by President 
Obama in his Presidential Study Directive on Mass 
Atrocities. “America’s reputation suffers, and our abil-
ity to bring about change is constrained”, Obama ar-
gued, “when we are perceived as idle in the face of 
mass atrocities and genocide” (Presidential Study Di-
rective on Mass Atrocities, 2011, p. 1).  
While the reputations of the United States, Canada, 
NATO, and perhaps the UN appear to have been key 
factors in the Kosovo and Libya interventions, we may 
not be able to generalize from this case since we are 
dealing with a circumstance in which intervention ac-
tually occurred. What role, if any, has reputational con-
siderations played in cases of non-intervention? If the 
evidence presented in the W2i report on the response 
to the unfolding genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is any in-
dication, the answer is, not much. With respect to Can-
ada, reputational concerns are only mentioned once in 
the report in the context of a memo written by a senior 
official, Robert Fowler, in which he urged quick and de-
cisive action, noting that history would harshly judge 
Canada’s reasons for its lack of concerted response 
(Memorandum to the Minister of National Defence Da-
vid Collenette, June 6 1994, quoted in W2i, 2009, p. 
78). Fowler recalled his widely-read memo “failed to 
substantively affect policy” although it “made people 
[in the Canadian government] feel guilty. That’s all” 
(W2i, 2009, p. 78). As for the United States, W2i shows 
that reputational concerns played a more direct role in 
the Clinton Administration’s response to the Rwandan 
genocide but not in a way that included cost-benefit 
calculations of how the administration’s policy might 
affect the United States’ reputation in the eyes of other 
international actors with whom the United States 
maintained on-going relationships. Instead reputation 
was considered only with respect to American public 
opinion and domestic human rights groups, albeit in ra-
ther contradictory ways: to show that the administra-
tion was sensitive to public concerns but also deter-
mined that any media reports showing the suffering of 
Rwandan victims would not push the administration in-
to doing something that it did not want to do (The 
Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008, pp. 101-102).  
Second, as already noted, states’ reputations are 
most at stake when rule violations are severe and 
when the nature of the commitment violated is clear. 
But even in these circumstances it is difficult to know 
how much reputational capital is at stake (Guzman, 
2002, p. 1877). The serial ignoring of R2P in all but a few 
cases suggests that failure to uphold the principle is not 
seen by a state’s allies as a serious violation. As such, 
states likely do not think less of each other when indi-
vidual or collective humanitarian intervention is not 
forthcoming in the face of mass atrocities (what aca-
demics and the public think is another matter). And 
since R2P is a relatively new non-institutionalized princi-
ple, the commitment made by states in publicly endors-
ing R2P is weak relative to other international legal obli-
gations that are codified in treaties and conventions.  
Third, the violation of R2P by western states does 
not demonstrably harm the (mostly western) allies of 
these states, leaving little prospect that reputations 
will be damaged and that reputational sanctions will 
result. Reputational loss and reputational sanctions are 
likely to be exacted by one’s allies only if these same 
states are the other parties to which a duty or obliga-
tion exists that has gone unfulfilled. In R2P most west-
ern states in the international system have made a 
commitment to protect the lives and physical integrity 
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of populations in states outside of the western alliance. 
The obligation of R2P, then, is not to one’s allies but to 
third parties who are often powerless populations un-
able to exact tangible sanctions on western states that 
fail to act to save them. 
The one circumstance in which reputational calcula-
tions might be different, however, is if the violation of 
R2P is attached to an international organization rather 
than its individual member states and if such a viola-
tion is seen by members to fundamentally undermine 
an international organization that is important to their 
own national interest. As we have seen, this appears to 
have been at least part of the logic behind the purport-
ed necessity of intervening in Kosovo and later Libya.  
5. Norms, Identity, and the Legal Codification of 
Atrocity Prevention 
Although reputational stakes are unlikely to play them-
selves out in the way predicted by compliance theory 
when applied to upholding R2P and stopping genocide, 
how states think about certain elements of reputation 
tied to conceptions of their own identity and how they 
construct each others’ identities, may be a way of re-
taining some of the insights offered by the literature on 
reputational stakes but seen through a constructivist 
rather than a liberal cost-benefit lens. 
The central problem identified by the authors of the 
W2i and GPTF reports is how to turn a norm that most 
states have agreed to into action. Although both re-
ports argue that self-interest linked to national security 
threats is the answer rather than appeals to moral du-
ties and obligations, it is still the case that operational-
izing R2P must include a discussion of how and why 
norms are upheld (or not). In this concluding section I 
would like to very briefly consider, theoretically at 
least, the relationship between norms and action and 
whether the legal codification of R2P would up the 
reputational states, as it were, for states that fail to 
uphold their responsibility to engage in robust atrocity 
prevention.  
The translation of norms into policy involves two 
closely related processes: norm internalization and pol-
icy-making (Reus-Smit, 2004; Sandholtz & Stiles, 2009; 
Wendt, 1999). Norm internalization is necessary for 
policies to emerge that reflect norms to which actors 
have publicly committed themselves in some way to 
other actors, be it specific domestic constituents, the 
general public, other states, non-state actors, or inter-
national organizations. This step is linked to self-
interest, something the two reports imply but do not 
argue explicitly. For states to initiate the practice of 
complying with norms, compliance at first needs to be 
seen as a matter of national self-interest. But because 
national self-interest can in certain circumstances lead 
actors to calculate that non-compliance is in their own 
interest, national self-interest is an unstable founda-
tion for norm compliance in the long run. For con-
sistent norm compliance, norms need to become inte-
gral to an actor’s self-conception, a component of 
one’s own identity, and thus reflected in actions or pol-
icies in such a way that compliance becomes simply a 
matter of “this is what we do” because “this is who we 
are” rather than calculations about whether compli-
ance with a norm furthers self-interest.  
The problem is that norm compliance through poli-
cies designed to prevent and stop mass atrocities is un-
likely to be internalized because atrocity prevention in 
non-Goldilocks cases—which constitute the majority of 
real-life cases—is not in the self-interest of western 
states, or the risks associated with norm compliance 
are calculated to be too high. As a result, the habit of 
consistently turning R2P into policy has not yet been 
developed and thus the first step on the road to norm 
internalization has not been taken by most states. In 
instances where R2P has been implemented it has 
been linked to meeting real threats to the real self-
interest of the interveners. This suggests that if the 
process of R2P norm internalization is happening at all 
it is stalled at the initial self-interest stage. Thus both 
Goldilocks and non-Goldilocks cases of self-interested 
compliance and non-compliance respectively seem to 
ensure that the R2P norm is destined, at least for the 
foreseeable future, to lack internalization in a way that 
a constructivist approach suggests would lead to the 
implementation of the R2P norm regardless of where 
mass atrocities occur. Even if the R2P norm were to be 
fully internalized there is no guarantee that norm in-
ternalization itself will always produce norm-compliant 
policies as has been the case, for example, of repeated 
non-compliance with the widely recognized norms 
concerning the treatment of refugees (Sandholtz & 
Stiles, 2009). 
Could the codification of R2P in public international 
law overcome this norm internalization problem by 
raising reputational stakes through the codification of 
enforcement measures and sanctions that are applied to 
states that fail to engage in robust atrocity prevention? 
Would upping the reputational ante help transcend 
compliance with R2P from reputationally-motivated na-
tional self-interest to a matter of national identity and 
legitimacy; that is, the full internalization of the anti-
atrocity norm by foreign and defence policy makers?  
There are arguments to be made that legal codifica-
tion might have this effect. First, states that negotiate 
international treaties do so under the general principle 
of pacta sund servanda (bargaining in good faith). Thus 
states as a matter of principle, and I would suggest 
reputation, promise to bargain and uphold interna-
tional law for the reasons they state publicly and not 
some pernicious ulterior motive. Second, states can 
agree to provisions in treaties that tie their good repu-
tations to compliance in ways that are not possible in 
CIL or written declarations by including clear legal obli-
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gations, mandatory dispute resolution and enforce-
ment mechanisms, and robust monitoring capacity. Re-
search suggests that the presence of these kinds of 
provisions tends to increase compliance since states 
calculate that violations will be more obvious (there 
are explicit rules that would be seen to be broken) and 
be met with mandatory tangible punishments (Sim-
mons, 2008, p. 195). Finally, international law legiti-
mizes behaviours that are codified as “legal” and con-
structs the identity of actors that uphold international 
laws as legitimate actors in good standing in the inter-
national community (Simmons, 2008, pp. 196-197). 
There are, however, very strong headwinds that 
would likely thwart or at the very least seriously dimin-
ish the effectiveness of a codified R2P treaty in terms 
of fostering norm internalization tied to reputational 
stakes. While scholars and legal practitioners have 
made compelling arguments concerning the moral ob-
ligations states owe to those requiring protection, as a 
practical matter, it is hard to conceive of exactly what 
enforcement mechanisms, particularly sanctions, states 
would realistically consent to include in such a treaty. 
We must remember that international treaty law only 
contains what signatory parties can agree to. While we 
know that robust monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms can change state behaviour in favour of treaty 
compliance, an explanation for why states would volun-
tarily agree to include these measures in something akin 
to a global Good Samaritan law in the first place is less 
clear. It would likely require states to already have in-
ternalized the anti-atrocity norm; precisely the thing 
that the codification of R2P is meant to produce. To 
paraphrase Rousseau, “states would have to be prior to 
laws what they ought to become by means of laws” 
(Rousseau, 2003). If past human rights instruments like 
the International Covenants on Political and Civil Rights 
and Social and Economic Rights are any indication, we 
would end up with a strong statement of legal obliga-
tions to protect vulnerable populations but with weak 
monitoring through self or third party reporting, and 
even weaker enforcement.  
But perhaps the biggest barrier to fulsome R2P 
compliance is that identified by Sandholtz and Stiles 
(2009) noted above. Even when, as in the case of the 
refugee regime, states universally sign on to interna-
tional treaties that contain strong legal obligations to 
uphold a norm that they have fully internalized, viola-
tions of these laws and norms by states still occur. The 
unfolding refugee crisis in Europe is sad testament to 
this fact. Thus even if states were somehow able to 
agree to a treaty that clearly articulated their legal ob-
ligation to protect and they internalized this norm as 
an obligation they ought to uphold, there is no guaran-
tee that widespread compliance with R2P would be the 
result. In the more realistic circumstance in which 
states would agree to a treaty with weak enforcement 
provisions, we would be no further along than we are 
now with R2P as a statement of principle akin to cus-
tomary international law. Reputational stakes would 
still be at play in the self-interested way I described 
earlier with little threat of adverse reputational or ma-
terial consequences for western and other states that 
shirk their humanitarian responsibilities.  
One solution to this problem is to take from the 
W2i and GPTF reports the insight that atrocity preven-
tion and intervention is only going to be saleable to 
states if it can be shown that national security and oth-
er tangible interests are at stake. But unlike in the re-
ports we need to recognize that appeals to security 
threats and self-interest will only be persuasive for re-
gional states directly and negatively affected by the 
outbreak of atrocities. In the cases of Kosovo, Libya, 
and the current attempt to degrade the Islamic State, 
the intervening states are western states acting to 
counter proximate regional and global threats and to 
safeguard their reputations. In cases outside the Goldi-
locks zone the “first responders” to atrocities are, or 
could be, regional states whose security and interests 
are directly at stake. These regional actors could be 
supported by western states that are committed in 
principle to the R2P norm as a self-interested reputa-
tional, but not a security or strategic, issue.  
This solution rests on the principle of subsidiarity. 
Subsidiarity claims that “each human individual is en-
dowed with an inherent and inalienable worth, or dig-
nity, and thus the value of the individual person is on-
tologically and morally prior to the state or other social 
groups” (Carozza, 2003, p. 42). The primary responsibil-
ity for upholding human dignity and human security 
lies with associations, organizations, and authorities at 
the “lowest” level in a system.  
A more explicit embrace of subsidiarity in the im-
plementation of R2P might facilitate genocide preven-
tion and intervention in such a way that action could 
become more likely and in a way that does not open 
the door for neo-colonial interference. First, if R2P is 
seen as primarily the responsibility of states and other 
actors most directly affected by the ripple effects of 
atrocities, the world will no longer wait, likely in vain, 
for just the west to intervene in instances where the 
west’s fundamental national security is not at stake. 
The operationalization of R2P based on subsidiarity 
would thus make R2P a truly collective responsibility of 
the entire international system and not solely the Unit-
ed States and other western countries. This shift could 
not only spur on timely intervention by regional actors, 
it may also help diffuse concerns that R2P is really a 
mask for neo-colonial interference in the affairs of so-
cieties in the Global South. Second, western states 
might be more willing to lend material and other sup-
port to local or regional responders since doing so 
would allow western states to uphold and “own” the 
R2P norm as part of their national identity but without 
having to spend their own blood and treasure to do so.  
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6. Conclusion  
In sum, a case can be made that genocide prevention 
and R2P more generally should be linked to western 
states’ national self-interest. Prevention as self-interest 
should not, however, be couched in terms of the west’s 
own security but rather concerns for safeguarding 
states’ reputations grounded in conceptions of them-
selves as good global citizens willing to assist first-
responder states directly affected by atrocities. Alt-
hough I have focused in this article on critiquing the 
prevention-as-security thesis and offered an alterna-
tive self-interest approach to fostering the consistent 
and robust operationalization of R2P, it is important 
not to dismiss out of hand the impact of humanitarian 
arguments. As the GPTF and W2i reports and the brief 
discussion of the Libyan intervention demonstrates, 
post-Rwanda, western policy-makers sometimes do 
genuinely believe that they have a responsibility to 
protect. Alas this belief is most likely to arise when the 
killing happens in the “Goldilocks” zone.  
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